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At the beginning of Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) Aristotle makes a crucial 
point: the cognitive faculties are defined in terms of their objects, i.e., “by being somehow 
similar and appropriate to their objects”  (1139a11-12).1  One may question how it is that nous 
(intelligence)
2
 is able to grasp two different objects: particulars and universals.
3
  Since Aristotle 
explicitly distinguishes between particulars and universals, one may wonder how both of these 
two actually are objects of the same cognitive faculty, and how two different processes, i.e., 
demonstration for universals and perception for particulars, operate here.  Aristotle seems to 
suggest that nous can be considered a sort of perception (aisthēsis) that, starting from particulars, 
proceeds by induction (1142a28-9; 1143b5-6).  Does Aristotle’s suggestion equate nous and 
aisthēsis in some sense?   
Understanding the relation between nous and perception is a very important and 
controversial aspect of Aristotle’s NE that requires examination.  The objective of this paper is to 
undertake such an examination.  The first problem to solve is determining whether nous and 
aisthēsis are concerned with the same objects or not.  If we take into account Aristotle’s claim 
that a cognitive faculty is defined in terms of its objects, the answer must be negative.   
Claudia Baracchi’s recent major work (2008) argues for a controversial thesis; she argues 
that there is a “simultaneity and indissolubility, if not identity,” of nous and aisthēsis at the core 
of Aristotle’s philosophy which “entail[s] the most far-reaching consequences” (pp. 20; 193-
204).  Focusing on a key passage in VI.11, (1143a33-b14), Baracchi reaches outside of the NE to 
support her interpretation of it.  She claims that in Metaphysics (Met) A.1, Aristotle provides a 
hint about “the genealogy of a noetic perception” (nous) (p. 23).  According to Baracchi, 
Aristotle expands on this notion especially in Posterior Analytics (AnPo) B.19 where he 
intimates “the indissoluble concomitance (if not the sameness) of nous and aisthēsis;” Aristotle 
considers “aisthēsis as informed by nous and deepens his examination of the structure of the 
intertwinement of the two” (p. 28).4   
                                                          
1
 Unless I indicate otherwise, I follow Irwin’s translation (1999) for NE, Barnes’ (1975) for Posterior 
Analytics, Ross’ (1995) for Metaphysics, and Irwin’s (1995) for De Anima. 
2
 Nous is traditionally translated as ‘understanding,’ ‘intellectual intuition, ’and merely ‘intuition.’  I use 
‘intelligence’ as Rowe (2002).   
3
 The universal is conceived as (a) ‘katholou’ i.e., ‘taken as a whole’ or in general, as opposed to ‘taken 
each in turn’ or particular; (b) that which can be or must be predicated of many things; (c) the primary object of 
definition, and scientific-knowledge.  Cf. Irwin & Fine, 1995, p. 619.   
4
 Baracchi translates aisthesis as ‘sensibility,’ ‘sensible-perception,’ and ‘sensation.’  She recognizes that 
nous is translated as ‘intellect’ or ‘intuition.’  Since she equates nous and aisthēsis, then nous is considered as 
‘sensible-intuitive,’ ‘noetic-perception,’ ‘intuitive-perception,’ and ‘intellectual-perception’ without distinction (pp. 
16-52). 
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Unquestionably, there are important parallels in the discussions of NE VI.8 and 11, Met 
A.1, and AnPo B.19.
5
  The AnPo generates questions about the nature and cognitive status of 
epistēmē and nous, which are regarded as always true.  The discussion seems to suggest that nous 
possesses a higher epistemic status than epistēmē because the former grasps first principles 
(archai), while the latter is the grasp of what follows from them.
6
  On the other hand, B.19 seems 
to say that perception and experience are necessary conditions for obtaining nous, and so 
epistēmē, in the first place.7  Nonetheless, even if Aristotle grants a higher status to nous than to 
epistēmē, and perception is ultimately the source of nous and all knowledge, to suggest as does 
Baracchi that there is an “indissolubility’ of nous and aisthēsis is a large and questionable step.   
Moreover, it is doubtful that consideration of the Met and AnPo would justify such a 
strong view.  While I do not have the space to discuss the Met and AnPo, I can say that 
Baracchi’s general reading is accurate.  It is her specific view about the aforementioned relation 
of nous
 
and aisthēsis that is unorthodox and too extreme.   
My goal here is to examine critically Baracchi’s view in light of a close reading of two 
central and complex passages VI.8, 1142a12-30 and VI.11, 1143a33-b12 from the NE to show 
that her view is unpersuasive.  I argue that Aristotle here maintains a fundamental distinction 
between nous and aisthēsis.  He considers nous to be a different capacity than sensation and 
mere perception, and one through which particulars and indemonstrable principles become 
intelligible.  I show further the significance of Aristotle’s claim that a state is defined in terms of 
its objects for understanding the distinction between nous and aisthēsis.   
This paper has three main sections: in the first, I will present a detailed overview of 
Baracchi’s argument in order to raise general problems with her account and to show that it 
conflicts with Aristotle’s overall project.  In the second, I will examine the first central passage, 
which sets up key issues for the second passage.  In the last section, I analyze the second 
passage, which will reveal more specific problems with Baracchi’s reading.   
 
                                                          
5
 Baracchi suggests that AnPo, Met, and NE are “dynamically related and forming an organic whole” (p. 
13).  
6
 Barnes (1975) translates nous as ‘comprehension’ and epistēmē as ‘understanding.’ Understanding 
“requires knowledge of the explanation and of what cannot be otherwise” (p. 83, see also p. 97).   
I use ‘scientific-knowledge’ for epistēmē as Irwin (1999), and as regarded in the relevant passages of our 
discussion, i.e., NE VI.8, VI.11 and AnPo B.19.  So I intentionally omit discussion on AnPo A.2 and A.3.   
Although I do not address the discussion about different characterizations of ‘epistēmē’ in AnPo, it is 
important to observe that at B.19 Aristotle connects epistēmē to demonstration, and distinguishes between nous and 
epistēmē (see also Barnes, p. 98)—this is the sense that I tackle in this paper.  Nonetheless, it is necessary to keep in 
mind that “Aristotle’s terminology is not stable”: at A.2, Aristotle says: “we do know through demonstration” i.e., 
scientific deduction “and by scientific [epistēmonikos] I mean one in virtue of which, by having it, we understand 
[epistasthai] something” (71b16-19).  Moreover, “apprehension of the principles is classed as a sort of 
understanding [epistēmē]” (Barnes, p. 98); therefore, nous—which grasps principles (at B.19)—can be considered a 
sort of epistēmē (at A.2). 
On the other hand, at A.3, Aristotle says: “the account of understanding threatens a regress which leads 
either to skepticism (72b7) or to the admission of circular proof (72b18); but in fact there is non-demonstrative 
understanding of the principles (72b18[-20])” (Barnes, p. 83; see also 84-98).  Hence, epistēmē can be considered a 
genus term, which involves both demonstration and nous.  In other words, in these contexts, nous would be a sort of 
epistēmē.   
See Perelmuter (2010) for another interpretation on the distinction between nous and non-demonstrative 
knowledge, and for the objects of nous: terms or concepts (horoi) vs. propositions or definitions: the objects of non-
demonstrable epistēmē, pp. 228-254. 
7
 See also NE 1141b18-20, 1142a14-21, and 1143a37-b12.   
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I. Baracchi’s Project   
 
In Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy (2008) Claudia Baracchi’s general project is to 
show that Aristotle believes that ethics is ontologically prior to metaphysics (and epistemology).   
She offers an iconoclastic reading of Aristotle’s discussion of the virtues of thought based 
on the supposition that practical wisdom (phronēsis) is theoretical in nature.8  She maintains that 
both phronēsis and theoretical wisdom (sophia) have as their object and end ‘the highest good,’ 
which, she asserts, is the first of all principles.  Baracchi’s reading is erected against traditional 
views that establish a hierarchy that favors the practical sphere over the theoretical, or vice versa.  
However, she challenges Aristotle’s explicit distinction between phronēsis and sophia by 
attributing an “inseparability” or “indissoluble intertwinement” of these virtues, which is 
supposedly at the core of Aristotle’s philosophy (pp. 1, 172, 213-4; cf. 170-219).  In arguing for 
such an intertwinement, Baracchi alludes to a concomitance of praxis and theōria and claims that 
sophia is not only theoretical or contemplative but “inherently practical,” given that it is 
“simultaneously” involved with “sensibility, experience, and, hence action”.  Phronēsis is also 
“pervasively theoretical” given that, in addition to the agent’s actions, it contemplates the good 
for oneself and the others (pp. 210-4; cf. 123; 208).  
It is worthwhile to see that although Baracchi offers a reading of passage VI.11, 1143a33-
b14 (see §III), she omits the last sentence where Aristotle concludes by establishing an explicit 
difference between phronēsis and sophia.  It is not surprising why Baracchi overlooks this line.  
However, this point works as evidence against her view that phronēsis and sophia are 
inseparable.  Certainly, phronēsis and sophia may share some properties, e.g., both aim at the 
truth, and the agent that possesses phronēsis, the phronimos, can be potentially sophos and may 
achieve ‘the highest good’ (eudaimonia) in the activity of contemplation (NE X.7-8).  However, 
Aristotle explicitly distinguishes phronēsis and sophia in terms of their nature, contents, methods 
of knowing and grasping the truth, as well as their agents’ function (ergon), ends (tēlos) and 
motivations (NE VI.8-11, X). 
What is at stake here is that Baracchi’s general reading seems to resemble her 
interpretation of some parts of VI.11, where she unjustifiably imposes the same notion of an 
“inseparability” of nous and aisthēsis.  She may attempt to show that there is also no hierarchy 
between these two cognitive faculties; however, it seems implausible within Aristotle’s larger 
project.  Throughout the discussion, she uses interchangeably adjectives such as, ‘identity,’ 
‘sameness,’ ‘conjunction,’ ‘unity,’ ‘indissolubility,’ ‘inseparability,’ ‘coincidence,’ 
‘intertwinement,’ and ‘indissoluble concomitance’ to refer to the relation between these two 
cognitive faculties.
9
  Presumably, this relation is justified in AnPo B.19 and NE VI.11 by (A) the 
                                                          
8
 Note the contrast with Reeve (2006; 1992): (1) phronēsis is supplemented by theoretical wisdom (sophia), 
or (2) epistēmē is a necessary condition in order for phronēsis to grasp certain kind of objects.  Such dependency can 
be seen: (1) “phronēsis as theoretical wisdom’s steward” or (2) phronēsis as requiring epistēmē.  Reeve (2006) 
restricts the sphere of phronēsis to particular premises.  Since phronēsis consists more in perception than in 
knowledge of universals, “it gains its knowledge of them at second hand from the scientific part” (pp. 10-11).   
On a reconciliation of the practical and contemplative spheres, see Rorty (1980), “The place of 
contemplation in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics” pp. 377-394.   
9
 Baracchi suggests an identity but she does not commit to this claim throughout; her theses vary from 
weaker to more restrictive. 
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role that sensation and induction play in grasping first principles,
10
 and (B) the fact that nous 
proceeds without logos to grasp its objects.
11
  
These issues generate important results for epistēmē: since epistēmē needs nous because 
it is able to grasp non-demonstrable principles without logos, and since the premises of epistēmē 
begin from sensation through an inductive process, and experience is relevant for acquiring 
epistēmē, it follows—according to Baracchi—that there is a limit of epistēmē: “a certain 
secondariness and non-self-sufficiency of the sciences.”  Therefore, epistēmē needs to be “re-
inscribed” “within the context of sensibility, intuitive-inductive evidence, and […] the 
experiential and practical domain” (pp. 189; cf. 187-195, 204, 213).12   
It is important to see that Baracchi correctly understands Aristotle’s account of how first 
principles can be known, and the cognitive faculty by means of which it is possible to know 
them.
13
  She observes that Aristotle recognizes the necessity of aisthēsis and experience for 
scientific-knowledge.  Since first principles are non-demonstrable, they cannot be grasped 
deductively through epistēmē; therefore, they must be grasped inductively.  The state by which it 
is possible to apprehend the principles is nous (cf. AnPo B.19, see my fn. 6 for clarification).  
Notwithstanding the core of her view remains unpersuasive.  I focus on two main 
problems.  The first concerns her attribution of a ‘simultaneity and indissolubility’ or the 
possibility of an identity of aisthēsis and nous.  Is she simply claiming that aisthēsis and nous 
operate together?  Does she go further by maintaining that these states are identical or only that 
even though they are different are to be considered the same?  It is unclear what sort of relation 
she attributes to Aristotle.  
A simple identity refers to two statements that assert that a named individual is identical 
to another named individual.  If she considers a simple identity here, then, nous = aisthēsis.  That 
is, we assume that nous is the same thing as aisthēsis or that nous and aisthēsis designate the 
same cognitive faculty.  It might be that Baracchi uses ‘simultaneity and indissolubility’ of nous 
and aisthēsis as a ‘conjunction’ or rule of implication, which stands for the claim that two 
propositions, say, N and A, asserted separately may be conjoined in whatever order either N and 
A, or A and N, without appeal to the commutative rule for conjunction.   So Baracchi may posit 
that nous implies aisthēsis and that aisthēsis implies nous.  It is unclear, however, how these 
cognitive faculties are implicated in the grasp of their respective objects.   
Baracchi’s inconsistent usage of terms to refer to those relations without offering further 
explanation, leads us to suspect that she may hold a less restricted relation.  For instance, 
‘coincidence’ and ‘concomitance’ seem to involve such a relation.  However, in order to 
                                                          
10
 Baracchi says: we come to know universals and first principles thanks to sensation.  Since “sensation is 
of the universal, it literally produces the universal in us.”  “Indeed, sensation brings… the possibility of revealing 
and actualizing the capacity … of nous.”  Hence, “[t]he formation and apprehension of universals is illuminated as a 
simultaneity and indissolubility, if not identity, of sensibility (aisthēsis) and intellectual perception (noēsis)” (pp. 35, 
32, 20).   
11
 Baracchi says: Nous grasps first principles without logos: “qua principles” they are inductively achieved 
“from sensibility.” Although principles “differ from particulars and cannot be reduced to them…, their genealogy… 
prevents us from thinking that universals and particulars are separable... or even opposed.”  Hence, “the ground for 
universal-apodictic procedures is the particular, which requires sensation and experience.  Such is the arkhē of 
epistēmē” (pp. 191-2, 187-8). 
12
 One might think that by subordinating the role of epistēmē, Baracchi also undermines her general project.  
Directly opposed to Baracchi’s view, Reeve (1992; 2006) attempts to strengthen the role of epistēmē and to 
subordinate the role of aisthēsis and phronēsis.   
13
 Irwin (1999) differentiates between ‘to know’ as gignōsk ein: grasping, or to be acquainted with 
something, and epistēmē or scientific-knowledge (p. 241).  Here I use ‘knowledge’ with the former connotation.   
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maintain this, it is necessary that a statement shows that there are n satisfied conditions that state 
N shares with state A, in comparison to another state that does not share n conditions.  Since she 
does not present these conditions, it is questionable that nous and aisthēsis correspond in such a 
sense.   
Moreover, it is unclear whether ‘nous ’and ‘aisthēsis,’ when Baracchi uses them 
independently, refer to such a relation or not.  For example, when she seems to imply that the 
particular or sensation is the archē of epistēmē, we do not know if she also implies that nous is. 
At AnPo 88b36-7 and 100b15-6 Aristotle states that nous is the principle of epistēmē.  However, 
if ‘sensation’ is conceived of as ‘identical’ to nous, then, she means that sensation and nous 
‘simultaneously’ are the archē of epistēmē.  In the framework of this problem, we face another 
difficulty: Aristotle considers that nous has a higher epistemic status over epistēmē, but not 
sensation or nous with the connotation of being ‘inseparable’ to sensation.  Consequently, it is 
unlikely that there is a prevalence of sensation over epistēmē or “a certain secondariness of the 
sciences,” as Baracchi supposes. 
The second problem with Baracchi’s reading concerns her attribution of a necessary “re-
inscription” of epistēmē within the practical order.  While perception and experience are surely 
sources of epistēmē, Aristotle stipulates that this state is independent of the practical sphere (NE 
1140b1; 1141b10; 1142a25-8; 1142b1-3).  The objects of epistēmē and phronēsis are 
fundamentally different from one another as well as from those that mere perception grasps (see 
§II).   
With this preliminary view explained, we shall see that these problems come to fore in 
the analysis of our second central passage: VI.11, 1143a33-b12 where I contend with Baracchi’s 
reading of relevant parts.  As the important concepts are clarified in the following section, we are 
able to avoid the seemingly inescapable “indissolubility” between nous and aisthēsis that 
Baracchi asserts.  The consequence of these elucidations would bring about a better 
understanding of the nature of nous.  I will next go into examining Aristotle’s passages.   
 
 
II. Aristotle’s NE: the Account of Nous and Aisthēsis 
 
Passages VI.8, 1142a12-30 and VI.11, 1143a33-b12 have several connections with other 
passages from Book VI; however, scholars have agreed that these two are directly connected to 
each other.  
Overall Book VI contains Aristotle’s discussion of the virtues of thought.  He explains 
that the rational part of the soul is divided in two: the deliberative or “rationally calculating” part 
(logistikon) and the “scientific part” (epistēmonikon) (1139a13-14).  Further, these “parts possess 
knowledge [or a certain sort of cognition] by being somehow similar and appropriate to their 
objects” (1139a11-12).  The “scientific part” studies universals or necessary beings that are the 
objects of the natural sciences or physics, and mathematics, whereas the “rationally calculating” 
part is concerned with particulars, i.e., variable or contingent things (1139a7-9; cf. 1139b23-24; 
1140b30-35; 1141a23-27).  The latter, then, is concerned neither with necessity (anankē) nor 
demonstration (apodeixis).   
Aristotle says in addition that the “best state” (hexis) of these parts “is the virtue of each 
of them” and that the virtue “is relative to its own proper function” (ergon) (1139a16-18).14   
                                                          
14
 Hexis is traditionally translated as ‘to have’ and ‘be disposed in some way;’ a relatively permanent way a 
subject is disposed (cf. Irwin & Fine, 1995, p. 615).  
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Hence, the virtuous states of the theoretical and rationally calculating parts are called, 
respectively, scientific-knowledge (epistēmē) and practical wisdom (phronēsis).   We should 
keep in mind that Aristotle specifies this distinction in our first central passage (1142a12-30).  
Now if the objects known by phronēsis and epistēmē differ in kind, but entail a certain 
kinship with them, it should follow that even if phronēsis involves possessing a certain sort of 
knowledge of ‘universals,’ it is not the same state as epistēmē.  Rather, there should be a certain 
kind of ‘universals’ that is suitable for practical wisdom.  
In order to explain the nature of these states, Aristotle frequently analyzes them based on 
the premise that the nature of the cognition is defined in terms of the objects that it grasps.  In 
other words, the “cognitive faculties must resemble their objects in order to cognize them” 
(Broadie, 2002, p. 361).  This point is recurrent throughout the discussion of Book VI—notice in 
these passages how the differentiation among cognitive faculties is given as a function of their 
objects of apprehension.  
 
 
II. A.   NE: VI.8, 1142a12-30 
 
I turn now to the first central passage:
 15
 
 
[A] A sign of what has been said about the unclarity of what [phronēsis] requires 
[A’] is the fact that whereas young people become accomplished in geometry and 
mathematics, and wise within these limits, [practically wise] young people do not 
seem to be found.  [A”] The reason is that [phronēsis] is concerned with 
particulars as well as universals, and particulars become known by experience 
[empeiria], [B] but a young person lacks experience, since some length of time is 
needed to produce it.  Indeed to understand the difficulty and importance of 
experience we might consider why a child can become accomplished in 
mathematics, but not in wisdom or natural science.  Surely it is because 
mathematical objects are reached through abstraction, whereas in these other 
cases the principles are reached from experience.
16
  
[C] It is… [evident] that [phronēsis] is not scientific-knowledge; for, as we said, 
it concerns the last thing i.e., the particular, since this is what is achievable in 
action.  [D] Hence it is opposite to [nous].  For [nous] is about the first terms, 
those that have no account of them; but [phronēsis] is about the last thing, an 
object of perception [aisthēsis] not of scientific knowledge.  [E] This is not the 
perception of special objects, but the sort by which we perceive that the last 
among mathematical objects is a triangle; for it will stop there too.  This is 
another species [eidos] of perception than perception of special objects; but it is 
still perception more than [practical-wisdom] is.  
 
The major points in this passage—divided above into sections [A]-[E]— are the 
following:  first, the difference among phronēsis, epistēmē, and, nous defined in terms of their 
                                                          
15
 Instead of ‘prudence’ I use ‘practical wisdom’ for phronēsis and ‘intelligence’ rather than 
‘understanding’ for nous. 
16
 I do not address Baracchi’s remarks about [B]: the relation between sophia and phusis, and “awareness” 
of sophia’s limitations, pp. 198-203.  Also, I intentionally omit lines a19-21: elaboration on the same point, and a21-
24: “deliberation may be in error about either the universal or the particular” (cf. 1139a5-15, 1141a23-7).  See 
Segvic (1990), pp. 144-171; Cooper (1975), Ch. 1.  
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objects; furthermore, the relevance of experience’s acquisition for both the practically wise 
person and the scientist in order to grasp the objects of their concern.  Finally, the crucial 
distinction among sorts of perception, and how the objects of nous differ in kind from those that 
sensation and mere perception grasp.  I suggest here that Aristotle refers to nous as a ‘sort of 
perception’ because it is analogous to mere perception in the sense that both cognitions do not 
involve logos and proof.  Also, this ‘sort of perception’ would lead to a sort of knowing, say, 
empirical-knowledge versus scientific-knowledge, which does not require having demonstrative 
structure.    
At[A] Aristotle brings back a puzzle discussed in VI.7 about the requirements of 
phronēsis, where he claims that since it is concerned with action, its objects known (gnōrimos) 
are both the universal (katholou) and the particular (kath’hekaston)—which is confirmed here 
[A”].  Since phronēsis is concerned with action, Aristotle emphasizes that it “must possess… the 
particular knowledge… more than the universal” (1141b22-3).  Part of the problem is that 
phronēsis, while possessing knowledge of universals, does not possess scientific-knowledge 
(epistēmē)—which is confirmed here at [C]—, but rather another sort that has to do with 
knowing how to act correctly, and knowing that living well is the highest goal.  Hence, in this 
discussion it is necessary to understand that the notion of the aforementioned ‘universals’ do not 
entail a necessary law-like relation in a strict sense, but are usually true (hōs epi to polu), e.g., 
judgments, beliefs, and practical advice (Irwin, 1999, p. 352), which is probable that they almost 
always hold (cf. 1143b12-4). 
Since Aristotle distinguishes between the objects of phronēsis and epistēmē at [C], it is 
convenient to consider that universals can be tentatively determined as: ‘always true’; e.g., in 
mathematics; ‘for the most part’ true, e.g., in physics; or ‘usually’ true, e.g., in ethics: a reputed 
belief (endoxa) (1139b8-9, b20-35; 1140b1-31).  Let us call the latter ethical-universals because 
they are part of the objects that phronēsis is concerned with, or quasi-universals, because they 
are not universals as in the rigid content of epistēmē.   
The specification of another kind of objects is important here [A”] and at [C].  According 
to Aristotle, phronēsis is concerned with ‘particulars.’  He primarily alludes to particular 
situations or actions, i.e., particular actions that promote the end, or actions of “determinate 
types” undertaken in order to achieve the best good (Irwin, 1999, pp. 245; 341).17  Let us 
consider that when Aristotle says that phronēsis has particular knowledge more than ‘the 
universal,’ he may suggest more familiarity with particular actions, i.e., being habituated to 
specific type of actions or having more efficacy in concrete actions whose specific type has been 
repeatedly practiced by an agent (Vasiliou 2007, p. 75).  Aristotle seems to imply here that 
knowledge of particulars is knowledge gained by experience, e.g., the practice of the same type 
of actions a person performs, which enables her to apply her knowledge of the quasi-universal to 
particular circumstances or situations.
18
  Notice that this point alludes to Aristotle’s emphasis on 
acquiring experience for distinguishing particular things at [A”].  Specifically, he illustrates it in 
VI.7: probably a person who knows “which sorts of meats are light” will be more successful and 
                                                          
17
 Irwin (1999) distinguishes “determinate types”—e.g., ‘bird meats’ as opposed to ‘light meats’—rather 
than “particular instances” or “individuals”—e.g., this piece of chicken (p. 245).  Cooper (1975) highlights “types of 
situations” (pp. 22, 28-30).   
18
 Segvic (1995) observes: the person that possesses phronēsis is “like the rest of us in that his conception 
of the good life is largely embodied in his dispositions to view particular situations, and respond to them, in certain 
ways” (p. 159). 
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be healthier than the person who only knows the general principle, i.e., “that lights meats are 
digestible and hence healthy” (1141b20-2).19   
In the framework of Aristotle’s distinction between objects, it is central to consider the 
role that experience plays.  Accordingly, the person acquires knowledge of particulars through 
constant practice with diverse type of actions, and so she gains the experience necessary to 
achieve her end, which evidently requires time.  This is why it is not possible to be a young 
practically wise person [A’]: while young people can acquire theoretical knowledge, e.g., to get 
the axioms and rules of geometry or mathematics, to be a practically wise person requires 
experience and time.  Yet, it is possible that these elements, however, are merely necessary but 
not sufficient conditions; experience and time by themselves do not guarantee the result.  
To expand: since knowledge of particulars is derived from experience, Aristotle may also 
believe that a young person would be able to get an ethical-universal, in a way relatively parallel 
to how a young person would learn a mathematical definition [A’, B], without yet having gained 
the experience necessary for responding to particular situations or for performing ethical actions 
in circumstances of her life.   
In support of this account, in [B] Aristotle attempts to show the scope of experience and 
sheds light on the sort of objects that the scientist and the wise person can access through 
experience.  The contrast with mathematical objects is evident again: even the inexperienced 
person can get access to those objects through abstraction.  Further, Aristotle offers an important 
claim: experience is relevant not only for the practical wise person in order to get to know 
particulars, but also for the scientist and wise person (sophos) in order to grasp the first 
principles (archai).  What is important to realize at this point is that in order to reach first 
principles induction is necessary—Aristotle maintains this thesis at section [G] of the second 
passage relevant to our discussion (see also 1139b30-2).  
The fact that, at [C], Aristotle distinguishes between phronēsis and epistēmē in terms of 
the objects known by the former, suggests that some of phronēsis’ objects are particulars, and 
phronēsis has more knowledge of them than ethical-universals or quasi-universals.  Phronēsis is 
not scientific-knowledge because it is concerned with the apprehension of the ‘last thing,’ the 
term refers to those things that are reached last as one proceeds “from the more general or 
universal to the more particular” (Irwin 1999, p. 247).  That is, Aristotle identifies particulars as 
“last things” by reference to both (1) the demonstrative structure of scientific-knowledge, 
namely, the deductive method which goes from universals towards explaining the conclusion, 
and (2) the objects of its concern that not only are necessary, but also come to be from necessity, 
and so they are first (cf. 1139b20-35).  Consequently, in this context ‘the last’ thing alludes to the 
particular that (a) “comes last (eschaton) in the process of deliberation” (Rowe, 2002; cf. Irwin, 
1999), (b) “the thing to be done [which] is an ultimate particular thing” (Rackham, 1934) or (c) 
“the decision and… the situational particulars as they appear under final analysis” (Broadie, 
2002).  At this point, it is important to remark that in our second relevant passage (see sections 
[F]-[G]) Aristotle also alludes to ‘the last.’  
In [D] we learn that nous has as its objects the ‘first terms’ or concepts (horoi).  Let us 
preserve Aristotle’s reference to them as principles (archai) stated at (1140b31-2), conceived as 
‘the most universal.’  Accordingly, nous has as its object the first principle of which there is no 
logos, i.e., no linguistic explanation or proof of the argument.  In other words, nous does not give 
“reasons” or explanations, and neither does it offer proof of the argument or provide further 
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demonstration.  Aristotle may imply here that having an account of p is to be able to provide a 
deductive argument for p, which is a characteristic of epistēmē.  However, since epistēmē cannot 
get access to principles, nous is the state whereby it is possible to know principles (cf. NE 
1140b33-6, 1141a8-9; see also my fn. 6 for clarification on this point).
 20
 
In order to provide more emphasis on the distinction between phronēsis and epistēmē, 
Aristotle offers an additional point: some objects of phronēsis, ‘last things’ or particulars, are 
grasped by perception (aisthēsis), as opposed to the objects of epistēmē.  Here, Aristotle 
indicates an important distinction between knowledge of universals and perception of particulars, 
as we will see when we turn to §III.  Although Aristotle considers that the last thing is an object 
of perception, it is not definitive that the objects of phronēsis are perceived—nonetheless, 
contingent things or individual objects, rather than actions, are always perceived.  This specific 
point seems to be the reason why, at [E], Aristotle posits a useful distinction and sheds light on 
the account of aisthēsis.  He rules out here that the perception of the specific objects of phronēsis 
is that whereby our five senses apprehend “special objects.”  In order to account for that 
perception, he mentions that it is similar to that which grasps objects like geometrical figures.  
Nevertheless, it is still another sort (eidos) of perception, which is after all closer to perception 
than practical reasoning.   
Here eidos comprises a form that is distinct from mere perception because it grasps 
objects of a specific sort, and thus, this may involve a kind of cognition whereby ‘what is 
achievable in action’ is apprehensible.  But why does Aristotle use a ‘sort of perception’?  One 
suggestion is that Aristotle may intend to show that the cognitive faculty that apprehends those 
objects is analogous to mere perception because it is likely that both cognitions do not involve 
logos and proof; in this sense, it could be like perception (see AnPo 92b3-4).  On the other hand, 
Aristotle may show that this sort of perception would lead to a sort of knowing, say, empirical-
knowledge versus scientific-knowledge, which of course would not require having demonstrative 
structure.  If I am correct, this would satisfy [C] and [D], and it would anticipate our second 
passage, i.e., sections [F] and [G].  After all, Aristotle may want to restrict the function of such—
relatively—undefined cognition, again, based on the discrimination of its specific sort of objects, 
and on the aforementioned two suggestions.
 
 
With these two preliminary suggestions, we can now fill in the details of how Aristotle 
considers nous to be a different capacity than sensation and mere perception, and one through 
which particulars and indemonstrable principles become intelligible.  
Irwin observes that at [E] Aristotle provides three ways of considering ‘perception’ in 
this context (pp. 247; 341-2).  I elaborate somewhat on them to determine their strict differences.  
First, let us call sensation the grasp relative to our senses or sensory modalities: sight, 
hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, whose “special objects” are, respectively, colors, 
sounds, smells, flavors, and textures.  If we accept that in other works Aristotle illustrates that 
our senses have their own distinctive objects for discrimination (AnPo 99b36), and he provides 
examples: colors for sight, sounds for hearing, etc. (DA, 418a11-16; 434b9–435a10), we might 
say that sensation has qualitative character in virtue of which one is able to sense, e.g., the 
distinctive pitch of a violin. 
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Second, let us call mere perception the grasp relative to the apprehension of figures such 
as the basic polygon with three vertices or “the triangle.”  Accordingly, one is able to have the 
common sense that it is “the simplest mathematical figure” (Irwin, 1999), or “the last element” 
(Rowe, 2002).  By ‘last’ here Aristotle may mean that the “triangle is the last form into which a 
rectilinear figure can be divided: two straight lines cannot enclose a space” (Rackham, 1934); in 
this sense, it would be the simplest too.  Next, Aristotle adds: “for it will stop there too.”  This 
suggests that perceiving that the triangle as the simplest figure does not demand an ulterior 
demonstration or proof.  Hence, ‘the triangle’ is “grasped by inference from the senses, but not 
by the senses themselves” (Irwin, 1988, p. 316).21  From this, we might infer that perception, as 
opposed to sensation, has a content that conceptualizes whatever thing that enables us to sense.  
Thus, perception would involve qualitative character and intentional content, e.g., I see that the 
simplest geometrical figure is a triangle.   
Finally, let us call discernment the grasp relative to phronēsis’ process of deliberation 
whereby premises about action or particular actions become intelligible rather than sensed or 
merely perceived.  Discernment or this sort of perception might involve, although not 
necessarily, qualitative character, but it definitely involves intentional content plus a mental 
attitude with regards to endoxa.  For example, based on an endoxa that p, I have the belief that p, 
then by practicing pa, pb, and pc actions I am able to discern pb actions as better options than pa 
and pc in order to achieve my end about p.
22
  In other words, this sort of perception allows us to 
discern similarities and differences among, in the first instance, a series of p actions and, 
derivatively from that, the corresponding endoxa that p.  This sort of perception turns out to be 
nous, as it will be shown next, which is the intelligence necessary to determine particular 
features in a given situation.
23
 
 
 
III.  NE: VI.11, 1143a33-b12 
 
The central points of the second passage relevant to our discussion—here divided below 
into sections [F]-[G]—are as follows: the analysis of nous, which grasps first principles and 
particulars, the plausibility that nous is the cognitive faculty or sort of perception mentioned at 
[E], and the claim that the inductive method is suitable for nous.  By examining this passage, I 
show why Baracchi’s interpretation that Aristotle suggests “the conjunction, if not the simple 
identity, of nous and aisthēsis” ends up being unsatisfactory.  
Aristotle opens the discussion by insisting that “all the things achievable in action are 
particular and last things.”  He then writes: 
 
[F] [Nous] is also concerned with the last things, and in both directions.  [F’] For 
there is [nous], not a rational account [logos], both about the first terms and about 
the last.  [F] In demonstrations [nous] is about the unchanging terms that are first.  
In premises about action [nous] is about the last term, the one that admits of 
being otherwise, and hence about the minor premise.  [G] For these last terms are 
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 Seeing “the son of Cleon” entails a “coincidental perception” that results from perceiving the perceptible 
qualities of the object (DA 424a24-425a30).   
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 I have the mental attitude independently of its utterance: “I believe that pb actions will lead me to achieve 
my end about p.” 
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 The intelligent agent is not excluded from sensing or perceiving, but “the good action… depend[s] on the 
well-functioning of rational thought and desire as such” (Broadie, 2002, p. 362). 
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beginning of the end to be aimed at, since universals are reached from 
particulars.  We must, therefore, have perception of these particulars, and this 
[sort of] perception is [nous]. That is why [nous] is both beginning and end; for 
demonstrations begin from these things and are about them.
24
  
 
At this point, we are in a position to see the parallel points of the two passages.  At [D] 
Aristotle says that nous is concerned with ‘first terms’ or principles; now, in [F] he claims that 
nous is able to grasp ‘last things’ too, ‘and in both directions.’  Aristotle contrasts nous with 
phronēsis in terms of their objects of concern at [D], and phronēsis with epistēmē not only in 
terms of their respective objects of concern, but also their respective methods at [A][C].  At [D] 
Aristotle specifies that nous does not offer an account of the first terms;
25
 now in [F’], he claims 
that nous is also concerned with the ‘last’ thing of which there is also no logos.  The meaning of 
‘last things’ is already settled at [C]-[D].  However, what does Aristotle mean exactly by ‘in both 
directions’?  Aristotle indicates that nous is the capacity of grasping both kinds of objects: 
universals that concern epistēmē and particulars that concern phronēsis, without implying that 
nous proceeds either by demonstrative knowledge or by practical reasoning.  Nous makes 
intelligible the truth of the first principles and also discerns what to do in particular situations; in 
this sense, nous is a sort of perception at [G], cf. [E].  The central point here is that both the first 
principle and the last thing become intelligible through nous without logos, i.e., no explanatory 
causal factor is given for grasping them.  
 
Baracchi writes,  
Nous is of both, and the distinction between nous as perceiving definitions and 
nous as perceiving singularities is only perspectival: seen from the operation of 
demonstration, nous provides the principle, the universal; seen from the operation 
of practical deliberation, nous provides the perception of the circumstances to be 
assessed.  Here we come to appreciate the twofold nature of nous, as intellectual 
stricto sensu and intuitive or, in fact, sensible.  In both cases, nous names… an 
intellectual-sensible grounding [where] there is no discursive knowledge, no 
logos.  
Aristotle here is not proposing a dichotomy of ‘practical nous’ and ‘theoretical 
nous,’ as it were, so much so that he emphasizes the fundamental role of 
particulars in the formulation of universals, and, hence, the implication of 
sensation in intellectual perception. Indeed, because of this he intimates the 
conjunction, if not the simple identity, of nous and aisthēsis—a conjunction that 
it will be hard to write off as solely applying to some subdivision of nous that 
would concern practical matters alone. (pp. 195-6)  
 
Several difficulties arise here.  First, Baracchi surprisingly overlooks passage [E] in 
which Aristotle distinguishes among sensation, mere perception, and a sort of perception.  
Missing this distinction, she considers nous as perception (aisthēsis) and not—or not only—as 
intelligence.  More strikingly, perhaps, is that her comments disregard the fact that perception is 
only of particulars and not of universals.  Aristotle suggests this at [D].  He confirms the point at 
[G] and in AnPo: “for of particulars there is perception; for it is not possible to get [epistēmē] of 
them” (81b6-7) and “[I]t is impossible to perceive what is universal,” “for one necessarily 
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perceives particulars, whereas [epistēmē] comes by becoming familiar with the universal” 
(87b32-88a 11).    
Baracchi might object that she takes into account Aristotle’s claim that “perception is of 
the universal” in AnPo 100a15-100b5.  However, if we examine that complex passage, it 
becomes clear that Aristotle refers rather to gaining access to universals from particulars by 
induction, or simply “that concept acquisition proceeds from the less to the more general” 
(Barnes, 1975, p. 256).  In other words, Aristotle shows that principles become known or 
intelligible by experience; he does not show that universals per se are perceived.  Thus, it is 
reasonable to presume that Baracchi either neglects or misinterprets this point.     
Moreover, we may wonder whether this is merely a semantic problem.  Since Baracchi 
understands that nous is the capacity to grasp both universals and particulars, and since 
universals are grasped from particulars by induction, she might consider it plausible to say that 
universals are perceived.
 
 However, even though she may add that ‘nous [intellectually] 
perceives definitions,’ it seems that the issue is not merely a semantic one.  Instead, Baracchi 
uses ‘perceiving definitions’ because she firmly believes that “the perception of principles is of 
incalculable consequence” (p. 29), and so she embraces a conjunction of nous and aisthēsis, 
which is an unconvincing reading of Aristotle’s project.  
It should be clear by now that Aristotle unquestionably values perception highly as a 
source of knowledge.  He also relies on it as a source of empirical inquiry (AnPo B.19; Met A.I).  
However, if we follow Baracchi’s account, it would be incorrect to equate nous with one of its 
sources.  For instance, Aristotle clearly accounts for a difference in kind by referring to two 
cognitive states: e.g., nous and epistēmē.  Although nous is the principle of epistēmē, nous cannot 
be epistēmē (AnPo 72b23-25, 88b36, 100b15).26  So there is no reason to consider a conjunction 
of nous and aisthēsis.  In fact, the ability to grasp an object p by sensing or perceiving it is 
different than—and prior to—the ability that involves experience and familiarity with that object. 
Also, these abilities are different than nous, or our capacity for conceptual thought that is 
involved in grasping intellectually specific objects.   
Furthermore, Baracchi’s claim that ‘the distinction between nous as perceiving… 
[universals] and nous as perceiving… [particulars] is only perspectival’ is unconvincing.  On the 
contrary, Aristotle’s distinction is fundamental; for one thing, universals and particulars are 
different objects (see NE 1139a7-9; 1139b23-4; 1140b30-5)
 
,
27
 but more importantly the methods 
by which epistēmē and phronēsis proceed in grasping their respective objects are different.  One 
proceeds by deduction, while the other proceeds by induction. Aristotle refers to these two 
methods when he mentions that nous is ‘in both directions.’  These methods display the cognitive 
objects with which nous is concerned, though this does not mean that nous proceeds by 
demonstration.
 
 
On the other hand, Baracchi’s conception that nous has a ‘twofold nature,’ is not 
consistent with the fact that nous makes intelligible the particular and the universal (in) both 
(directions).   There is no evidence that nous constitutes a dual nature, as she supposes.  The only 
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DA III.7, 431a8-b19. 
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special intellectual excellence that entails a dual nature for which there is evidence is phronēsis, 
which involves both intellectual and practical capacities.  The conception of a twofold nature of 
nous goes hand in hand with Baracchi’s conceptions of unity, identity, etc., of nous and 
aesthesis, which is untenable, as we will see when we turn to section [G]. 
Lastly, even though in the final sentence of Baracchi’s quotation above she recognizes a 
relation of non-discursive knowledge with logos, the fact that there is nous but ‘not logos’ is 
interpreted by her as a limit of “thinking”—here [F’] and by reference to [D] as well: “Nous 
pertains to the domain enclosed within the extremes of particularity, on the one hand, and 
definitions, on the other… [which]  bound and delimit the space of thinking.” (p. 195).  It is 
unlikely that Aristotle classifies nous as a virtue of thought, and simultaneously limits its 
function in thinking.  Instead, it is more plausible to hold that nous proceeds by thoughts even 
though it does not involve a linguistic explanation of the first terms and last things.  Thus, being 
without logos does not weaken its rational capacity, strictly speaking, nor does it delimit or limit 
‘the space of thinking.’  It only shows that nous does not proceed by demonstration or that nous 
is a non-discursive cognitive faculty. 
In the remaining part of this paper, I hope to elucidate what Aristotle means by saying at 
[G] that ‘nous is both beginning and end.’  Baracchi writes, the fact “[t]hat nous should be ‘both 
a beginning and an end’ corroborates the unity of nous as a matter of both intellectual and 
sensible perception” (p. 196).  Again, Baracchi’s thesis seems unconvincing.  First, Aristotle’s 
statement does not seem to ‘corroborate’ any ‘unity of nous as a matter of both intellectual and 
sensible perception.’  Rather, Aristotle suggests that nous gets intellectual access to first 
principles by induction.  Since universals are reached from particulars, or so-called ‘last things,’ 
these are considered the beginning of the inductive process, which of course are also the end 
when these are considered with reference to the deductive method: from universals to particulars, 
cf. [D].   
Baracchi comments further: “[N]ous presides over the ‘inductive synthesis’ originally 
connecting particulars and universals,” and hence, Aristotle “intimates the conjunction, if not the 
simple the identity, of nous and aisthēsis” (pp. 194-6).  Aristotle certainly points out that the 
universals are grasped inductively, and by exercising intelligence it is possible to discern “the 
relevant features of particular situations, so that general principles can be applied to them” 
(Irwin, 1999, p. 250), or, similarly, that an endoxa can be confirmed through particulars.  In other 
words, by constant exercise of particular experiences, say actions pa, pb, and pc, it is possible to 
make them intelligible, and it is possible to obtain a ‘general principle’ p.  Yet perceiving is of 
particulars and not of the universal.  While perception forms part of the process of induction, 
acquisition of the universal is the result of repeated instances of p type (AnPo 88a3-14), i.e., “we 
do not strictly speaking realize that some connection holds universally in the simple act of 
perception itself” (Lesher, 1973, p. 53).  
 Finally, on my understanding, by saying that ‘nous is both beginning and end,’ Aristotle 
claims that the cognitive faculty is defined in terms of its objects.  He says at [F] that ‘last terms 
are beginning of the end to be aimed at,’ since these objects are grasped by nous.  Instead of an 
‘identity of nous and aisthēsis,’ Aristotle introduces at [E] a sort of perception, which is 
recognized as intelligence here, and it is determined in terms of its objects.
28
  If the objects of 
nous were the same as those of sensation, or mere perception, or if nous and aisthēsis comprise 
an identity, nous would not be both beginning and end in the sense that Aristotle posits.  Nous 
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would only grasp particulars: since there is no sensation or perception of first principles.  
Principles are grasped through nous by induction, and nous or intelligence seems to be self-
sufficient in grasping its objects, just as sensation and perception grasp their corresponding sorts 
of objects.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
By examining two key passages of Book VI, I have shown that Aristotle does not equate 
nous and aisthēsis in any sense.  Baracchi’s argument to the contrary is unsuccessful.  Even 
though Aristotle identifies nous as a sort of perception, it is considered a different capacity from 
sensation and the ordinary perception by which particulars and indemonstrable principles 
become intelligible.  Nous or intelligence is an independent cognitive faculty that does not 
require perception for grasping its objects.  While Aristotle emphasizes that experience is 
relevant in order to grasp particulars and that it is possible to grasp first principles by induction, 
he does not attempt to show that sensation and experience enjoy a higher status than epistēmē 
and nous. These processes are complementary for achieving knowledge.  I hope to have shown 
significance of the fact that the differentiation among cognitive faculties is given as a function of 
their objects of apprehension.
29
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